

THE CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECOND OF AQUINAS'S FIVE WAYS

By
Kamarudin Haji Salleh*

Abstract

This short article aims at delineating the contemporary interpretations of the second Aquinas's five ways. There are two tendencies among the twentieth-century philosophers in approaching the issue. The philosophers like Kenny and Flew seem criticize and reject the second way argument to prove the existence of God. On the other hand, Velevky, Copleston and Craig claim that earlier is mis-understood and take the proof out of their context in Aquinas's thought.

INTRODUCTION

As they appear in the *Summa Theologiae*, St Thomas Aquinas's so-called five ways are bracketed by two objections and two replies to these objections. Now in commenting and interpreting on the five ways, many twentieth-century philosophers writing on Aquinas, including Kenny, and Flew make no complete reference to those objections and replies to them. This is surely odd, for throughout the *Summa Theologiae* objections and replies provide the framework within which Aquinas unfolds his ideas, and they thus provide a basic key for interpreting the text.

W.L.Craig adds, relating to the same situations from a different angle, that Aquinas is one of those philosophers whom nearly everybody quotes but whom few understand. Probably more ink has been spilled over his celebrated five ways for proving the existence of God than over any other demonstrations of divine existence, and yet they remain largely misunderstood today (1980, 158). This happens because these five brief paragraphs are so often printed in anthologised form and therefore read in isolation from the rest of Aquinas's thought. To take this proofs out of their context in Aquinas's thought and out of their place in the history of the development of these argument will tend only to obscure the nature of the proof.

*Lecturer, Faculty of Islamic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi.

Modern readers, used as they are anthologised versions of Aquinas's five ways, all too often fail to grasp this important point. Aquinas is sometimes criticised for what is thought to be over-hasty conclusion;... and this is what everybody understands by God, but this misunderstanding arises only by tearing Aquinas's proofs out of their proper context. In this paper I shall attempt to delineate the contemporary interpretation, commentary, and elaboration of the second way, as given by such scholars and philosophers as Kenny, Flew, Craig and others.

For this reason, the best way to undertake the discussion is to begin with the tabling of the text of Aquinas's second way

"The second way is based on the nature of causation. In the observable world causes are found to be ordered in series; we never observe, nor ever could, something causing itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is not possible. Such a series of causes must however stop somewhere; for in it an earlier member causes an intermediate and the intermediate a last (whether the intermediate be one or many). Now if you eliminate a cause you also eliminate its effects, so that you cannot have a last cause, nor an intermediate one, unless you have a first. Given therefore no stop in the series of causes, and hence no first cause, there would be no intermediate causes either, and no last effect, and this would be an open mistake. One is therefore forced to suppose some first cause, to which everyone gives the name 'God'"¹. (S.T.Ia. 2.3.)

¹In Father Dominican Translation as follows:

In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity *per se* - thus, there cannot be an infinite numbers of causes that are *per se* required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity 'accidentally' as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause their multiplication being accidental; as artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after another may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all man generating hold one grade in efficient cause - viz., the grade of particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity, but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Before going on to consider the interpretation of the text above in any detail, I would like to put forward Aquinas's explanation on efficient causes, which is widely discussed and elaborated by the Modern philosophers. Moreover, this text is an important sources in order to support and argue the second way in Aquinas's thought.

"An infinite series of efficient causes essentially subordinate to one another is impossible, that is causes that are per se required for the effect, as when a stone is moved by a stick, a stick by a hand, and so forth; such a series cannot be prolonged indefinitely. (But) it is not impossible to go on forever per accidens in a series of efficient causes, as when they are all ranged under causal heading and how many there are is quite incidental, as a smith may act by using many different hammers, per accidens, if one after the other is broken. For it is not essential for any particular hammer to act after the action of other, and it is likewise not essential for any particular man, qua begetter, to be begotten by another man; for he begets qua man, and not qua son of another man. For all men begetting holds the same rank in the order of efficient causes, namely that of being a particular parent. Hence it is not impossible to go on forever in the series of men begetting men; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of men depended on another and on an element, and on the sun, and so on to infinity". (S.T. Ia. 46. 2.7.)

Regarding of the second way principle, it is very important to note that Aquinas's argument is by no means original. He is heavily indebted to the work of authors earlier than him to Aristotle, for example, and the Jewish and Islamic authors such as Maimonides, Avicenna and Averroes. However Aquinas is not a slave of his sources. Aquinas made a radical development of the Aristotelian notion of efficient causality. It continues to recognize the Aristotelian form as cause of being, but only under the activity of an efficient cause. It makes efficient causality antecedent to all finite form. So that finite form is brought into being by reason of the existential actuality it limits and specifies. Efficient causality now bears upon the whole of the finite thing and extends to the production of both matter and form through a creative act- the bringing of something into existence rather than initiating of motion. In Aristotle matter was related to form as potentiality to actuality, but now the whole finite things is seen as itself a potentiality to its own existence.

In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Aquinas names Aristotle as the sources of the proof. Aristotle had analysed the notion of cause into a four-fold typology and argued

that an infinite regress of causes was impossible in any way of the four; Final, Efficient, Material, Formal² (Etienne Gilson 1924, 60).

The second way is an argument from efficient causality. Aquinas writes;

“The Philosophers proceed in a different way 2 Metaphysic, to show that it is impossible to proceed to an infinity of causes, and that we must come to one first cause, and this we call God”.
(*Summa Contra Gentiles I. 13*)

From my understanding, the second way quotation means, since everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence and the universe began to exist, we conclude, therefore the universe has a cause of its existence, We ought to ponder long and hang over this truly remarkable conclusion, for it means that transcending the entire universe there exists a cause which brought the universe into being *ex nihilo* (the production of thing from nothing either itself or of a subject which could sustain the finished product). If our discussion has been more than mere a academic exercise, this conclusion ought to stagger us, ought to fill us with a sense of awe and wonder at the knowledge that our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it.

INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND WAY

Now we turn to examine the stages of development in the second way in order to have a clearer comprehension.

The first step, *“that we observe in the world efficient causes ordered in a series”*. First, it is not altogether clear what Aquinas means here by efficient cause,

²The four kind of causes may be arranged and illustrated as follows; External causes; efficient and final. Internal causes: formal and material

a) An efficient cause is external agent by whose operation a thing comes to be; a father is efficient cause of his son, or a craftsman the efficient cause of an article of furniture.

b) A final cause is the end for which the thing exists; beatitude is the final cause of man; or use is the final cause of a chair.

c) A formal cause is the intrinsic active principle whereby a thing is of a certain definite nature; the soul of man is his formal cause.

d) A material cause is the intrinsic passive principle out of which a thing is made; the body is the material cause of man

Aristotle spoke of efficient causes as moving causes, that is to say, causes which induce change in quantity, quality, and place. On this basis, there seems to be little difference between Aquinas's first and second way. The first way looks at such phenomena from the point of view of the effect or body acted upon, while the second way consider the process from other end, starting from the agent rather than from the patient, from the mover rather than the things in motion (A. Kenny 1969, 36). But this a difference of aspects only. Furthermore, in Gilson's word, while the first brings us to God as the sources of the cosmic movement and all movements dependent on it, the second leads us to Him as the cause of the very existence of things (E. Gilson 1924, 62). We have found that God is the moving causes³, now we know that he is the efficient cause. It is well to note the close relation between the second Thomistic proof of the existence of God and the first; in both cases, the necessity of a first cause rests on the impossibility of an infinite regress in an ordered series of causes and effects.

Geach suggest the following elaboration in order to avoid confusion between the first and second way. The first two ways differ only in that one relates to processes of change and the other to things coming to be; the further argument is quite parallel in each cause, if B is the cause of a process going on in A, or of A's coming to be, then it may be that this happen because of a process in B that is caused by a further thing C; and C in turn may act because of a process in C caused by D; and so on. But now let us lump together the chain of things B, C, D, ... and call it X. We may predicate of each one of the cause B, C, D, ... and also of X as a whole, that it cause a process in A (or the coming - to be of A) in virtue of being itself in process of change. (P.T. Geach 1963, 112)

The second step in the outline is that "*something cannot be self-caused*". Aquinas argues that this is impossible because for a thing to cause its own existence it would have to exist before itself, which is self-contradicting (W.L. Craig 1980, 158). The implicit basis of this proof is the actuality/potentiality distinction. One of the corollaries of that distinction is that the potential cannot actualise itself; there must be an actual being to bring the potential to actuality. Thus, a thing that does not have actual existence, but only potentially exists, cannot cause itself to exist. For it would have to be actual to do this, but it is only potential. It has no actual being whatsoever. Thus, nothing can be the cause of its own existence

³Relating to the concept of God as a 'Moving Cause'. Aquinas does not mean that the world does not contain things which can be change in themselves or that animals can do so. He would say, however, that nothing in the world is wholly the source of its own change. Furler elaboration, see Christopher Martin (ad.), 1966, *The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*.

Now this seems reasonable enough on a temporal basis, that is to say, on the basis of a regress back to the beginning (if there was one) of the universe; for if originally nothing existed, it seems impossible that the world could cause itself to come into being. But the proof is not concerned with a temporal regress; Aquinas is considering a hierarchical series of causes of existence. Therefore, when he says that a thing would have to precede itself to cause itself, he cannot be thinking of chronological precedence, unless he has confounded the argument, but of some sort of metaphysical or logical precedence.

Aquinas's third step is that "*such a series cannot be endless or not possible to go on to infinity*". His proof is a sort of "*reductio ad absurdum*" and is a form of the some argument offered in the first way (W.L. Craig 1980, 178). In any series of causes, there is an earlier, an intermediate and a last member. If there is no first in this series there can be no intermediate and no last member either. This is because in an essentially subordinated series the causal efficacy of the subsequent causes is an effect of the first cause. Since if one eliminates a cause one eliminates its effect, then one removes the first cause one removes its effect, which are the subsequent causes (for a cause without causal efficacy is not a cause).

Aquinas acknowledges that the number of intermediate causes makes no difference; they are still dependent for their causality on a first cause. Thus, Aquinas adds parenthetically to the version in the *Summa Theologiae*; whether the intermediate be one or many. Therefore such a series cannot be endless. It is noteworthy that Aquinas in the second way lumps together, so to speak, all the intermediate causes and considers them as a single whole (*Summa Theologiae* Ia 46.2.7).

The final step in the proof is that "*there must be a first cause*", which everyone call God. Here the appellation seems more fitting, for the first cause is the cause of the existence of the whole world.

If I rightly comprehend the second way in particular and the five ways in general, Aquinas, although he says that the five ways are the argument for the existence of God, they are not intended as an exhaustive defence of belief in God's existence. Contrary to what is sometimes supposed, they are only a first stage. More precisely, they do not purport to show that and ovi sts with all attributes tradition ascribed to him.

SOME CRITICISMS AND REJOINDERS ON THE SECOND WAY

In the second section on this paper, I will concentrate to some interpretations, objections, and criticisms of the second way from different points of view of scholars. I will confine myself to the few important points only, because space does not permit me to survey them further. Nevertheless, I intend to stress here that some criticisms deliberately apply to the cosmological argument as a whole.

Kenny advocates that "*the five ways fall, I shall argue, principally because it is much more difficult than at first appears to separate them from their background in Medieval Cosmology*" (1969, 14). The decisive refutation of the second way which Kenny cited is as follows;

Aquinas accepted certain theories in Medieval Astrology, and, in his view things like the generation of peoples involve the causal activity of sun. He concentrates on these facts and suggests that they can be used to criticise the second way. As it put it himself; Aquinas believed that the sun was very much more than a necessary condition of human generation. The human father, he explains in generation is tool of the sun.... The series of causes from which the second way starts is a series whose existence is vouched for only by Medieval Astrology (Brian Davies 1993, 41).

Kenny also in other words criticises the second way in the following statements; Observing that Aquinas believes that in human pro-creation the sun and the heavenly bodies constitute a hierarchy of efficient cause that work through men as instrumental causes in the generation of new persons, accordingly, Kenny flatly rejects the second way as based on an '*archaic fiction*'. However, the question here is whether there is something which is of value when the proof is divested of the Medieval trappings.

Before we go on to further detail of criticisms of the second way, We need to ask whether the argument is a reasonable one?. A sympathetic formulation of Aquinas's second way might say that some of the criticisms levelled against it are either unfair or inconclusive. Take, for example, Kenny's claim that the second way can be rejected because it depends on theories in Medieval theories. This claim is not very plausible. A supporter of Aquinas may well allow that Aquinas held odd view about Astrology. He may therefore concede that many particular causal explanations which Aquinas might give of a particular events are demonstrably mistaken. But he can also add that this point is utterly irrelevant to the argument of the second way.

As the text of the way seems to suggest, the second way is concerned with general questions rather than particular ones. In a sense it is arguing about causality itself. Another reply might suggested to Kenny's criticisms is described by Craig;

"My existence now is dependent upon the temperature of the earth's atmosphere, which in turn is dependent upon the distance of the earth's orbit from the sun, which is dependent upon the mass of the sun, which is dependent upon the sun's relation to other stars, which are dependent for their existence upon our galaxy, which is dependent for its existence upon surrounding galaxies, and so on and the recesses of the universe. Aquinas's argument would contend that we must posit a first efficient cause of this series which is the cause of the present existence of anything now in existence. The argument would not then be in any sense dependent upon Aristotelian Cosmology. But to return to Aquinas, when he states that we observe in the world efficient causes ordered in a series, he is thinking of a system of celestial spheres" (1980, 176).

Another reason offered for rejecting the Cosmological argument bring us to what sometimes called "*the problem of infinite regress*". Many contemporary philosophers give great attention to discussing this issue. The Cosmological argument seems to be saying that there cannot be an infinite series of causes; That the buck, so to speak, stops somewhere. Aquinas, for example, say that there cannot be an infinite series of changed changers, caused causes, or necessary beings each of which owes its necessity to something else. But in reply to such points people have asked, why there cannot be an infinite series of causes. They have also asked how the Cosmological argument can avoid contradicting itself. If for instance, nothing causes itself, how can there be a first cause which does not itself require a cause other than itself?. Anthony Flew clearly mentions that; this disgraceful argument is outstanding among fallacies; not merely does the conclusions not follow from the premises; it actually contradicts them, while they each contradict the other. Flew adds that the second way is not that a process must have a start but that a hierarchy must have a summit (Anthony Flew 1966, 86).

It has also been maintained that there is simply no need to talk about existence in the manner of writers like Aquinas and Leibniz. Both seem to be saying that we can ask why something exists when it need not and the answer to the question is God who creates and arranges the whole universe. According to some people, however, the existence of things must just accepted as a '*brute fact*'.

Flew, moreover, believes that "*the first three ways of the five ways can be tackled as a group*" in his book *God and Philosophy* (4: 31) (L.C. Velecky 1968, 203). This belief presumably justifies in Kenny's eyes, neglect of ways one and three; if they can be regarded as so many variations upon a single basic theme (4.34), it is enough to refute way two in order to dispose of the remainder. Of course, the question is whether or not it is right so to regard ways one to three. Undoubtedly, they will exhibit certain common features and will have the basic structure of moving '*from finite, limited conditions existence to an infinite unconditioned creator*'. But the points is whether or not their starting points and their procedures are so different that the ways out irreducible. Flew also does not provide any argument to justify his view that the differences in starting points and procedures can be disregarded .

Flew according to Velecky, having misguidedly argued against the guidedness of things, next calls Aquinas to task for attempting to get from the order of the universe as a whole the the orderer in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. He thinks that '*once the protracted preliminary manoeuvre have located and isolated the key position, the final operation can be short and its tactics simple*' (3. 19). He does indeed try to make short work of Aquinas's statement and his tactics are so simple as to seem an oversimplification. Flew makes two points;

a) Order does not, as a matter of logic, require an orderer;

b) It is no good redefining order so as to warrant the deduction of an orderer since a verbal adjustment cannot transform the physical situation (3.21).

Aquinas would have agreed with both points, but he would have regarded them as irrelevant to his own position. His argument, incidentally, is not his entirely but owes its inspiration to John of Damascus. As in the *Summa Theologiae*, it is based not on the idea of order but on the alleged guidedness of things. Moreover, he does not attempt to deal with the world as a whole but only with certain entities. "*aliqua contraria et dissonantia*". Finally, he does not redefine order so as to smuggle in the orderer. And thus the conclusion is forced on an impartial enquirer that once more Flew's attack is doomed to failure because the key position has not been located (Velecky 1968, 203-230).

Again Flew tries to criticize the second way which he thought bound up with Aristotelian astronomical system and medieval model. He think that this one will probably appear the most immediately intelligible and forceful to the modern student not soaked in the background ideas of Aristotelian Metaphysics (4.25) (Flew 1966, 87). This is a surprising estimate. Aquinas tell us the way two is also based on Aristotle. If then Flew think that one can understood way two without appreciating

its Aristotelian background, he cannot interpret it according to its author's intentions. This, in fact, soon become apparent. For Flew's complaint is that, it is only and precisely in so far as we continue to think of temporally successive link in the causal chain that the argument has the momentum to carry us along (4.27). Aquinas, however, say no thing about the familiar order of temporal succession. Indeed, such an interpretation of way two must be ruled out by his implicit statement that efficient causes seen in a temporal succession do not lead to God and can go an '*ad infinitum*' within creation without pointing to creator (S.T. Ia 46.2.7)

Greach argues that Aquinas accordingly holds that God cannot be reached by saying that this sort of causal chain must end in him; The chain could be endless. He uses the simile of an immortal blacksmith who has been making horse shoes from all eternity, and has naturally worn out no end of hammers in the process; the making of the horse-shoe now on the anvil depends only upon the smith as efficient cause and the hammer currently in use as instrument; and though no end of hammers have in fact been broken in the past, they have nothing to do with the case. Similarly, God uses parents to produce a new human being; Since they are mortal, he does not use the same pair of parent each time; but as regards understanding the production of this human being here and now, we need not bring into account all the past and perished generations of men, and it is no matter whether they were a finite or infinite series (1963, 112).

Flew, however, keeps to the irrelevant idea of temporal succession and tries to make Aquinas look foolish by suggesting that for Aquinas the idea of the first efficient cause "*involves a logical contradiction*" (4. 27). But if Aquinas's concept of efficient cause does not necessarily involve temporal priority this alleged contradiction must be only of Flew's imagining. And there is an even more elementary error in Flew's interpretation of the phrase "*we do not find, what is not possible, anything which is an efficient cause of itself*"; This is not a context-free phrase. It is part of the initial statement that "*we discover in phenomena an order of efficient causes*". What Aquinas says is that in the phenomenal world- we never find that anything causes itself and that it is in fact unthinkable that we could ever find here a cause of self-causation. He does not suggest that the idea of an uncaused caused involves a logical contradiction (4.27).

Finally, before we come to the end of this paper, I will develop more detail concerning the interpretations of *per se* (vertical efficient cause) and *per accidens* (horizontal efficient cause) (S.T. Ia 46.2.7) already touched on slightly in an earlier discussion. The first statement is that the causal regress like A's being begotten by B,

B's being begotten by C, and so fourth, can go to on infinity (horizontal), whereas causal regress like Z's being moved by Y, Y's being moved by X, and so fourth, cannot. Interpreters frequently suggest that we should think in terms of diagram; in which the temporal succession of event is represented by a horizontal line; and the Divine support and inspiration indicated by vertical.

It is important to note that it is the composite causal series, and not the individual constituent causes, which Aquinas is contrasting as either *per se* or *per accidens* in the quotation above. Aquinas does not treat causation as a number of successive changes strung together, but as the co-presence of effect and cause in one proceeding; he is forming a whole, not searching for the first of a class, and so he looks, not from one action to the previous action, but deeper and deeper into one action within which a higher principle contains a lower. The origins as soon found lie as deep as divinity. That the argument involve a composition on grouping together of the members of the causal chain.

Aristotle had of course differentiated between essential and accidental causes, meaning by the latter an accidental attribute of an essential cause; but that is not the distinction to which Aquinas is here alluding. This is confirmed by Dun Scotus's comment in his presentation of the argument;

It is one thing to speak of incidental causes (causae per accidens) as contrasted with those which are intended by their nature to produce a certain effect (causae per se). It is quite another to speak of causes which are ordered to one essentially or of themselves (per se) and those which are ordered only accidentally (per accidens) (A Wolter 1962, 40).

There is, then, a difference between essential and accidental causes on the one hand, and essential and accidental ordering of causes on the other. Moreover, it is the latter distinction which is supposed to be germane to the impossibility of certain infinite causal regressions; infinite causal regression per accidens is said to be possible, while infinite causal regression per se is said to be impossible. Scotus fortunately tells us in some detail what was understood by the crucial contrast; per se or essentially ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes.... in essentially ordered causes, the second depends upon the first precisely in its act of causation. In accidentally ordered causes this is no the case, although the second may depend upon the first for its existence, or in some other way. Thus a son depends upon his father for existence but is not dependent upon him in exercising his own causality (that is, in

himself begetting a son), since he can act just as well whether his father be living or dead⁴ (A. Wolter 1962, 40).

Copleston, furthermore describes, the difference between these two interpretations in these words; when Aquinas talk about an order of efficient cause he is not thinking of a series stretching back into the past, but of a hierarchy of causes, in which a subordinate member is here and now dependent on the causal activity of a higher member. Thus; We have to imagine, not a lineal or horizontal series, so to speak, but a vertical hierarchy, in which a lower member depends here and now on the present causal activity of the member above it (1955, 122).

Kenny tell us that, the series of causes in the second way.... does not stretch backward in time, but stretches into the heavens simultaneously. It is this series which must come to an end with God. Another auestionarises; why was an infinite regress thought to be impossible in an essentially ordered series (vertical), but not in an accidentally (horizontal) ordered one?. It has been widely believed that it was purported simultaneity in the former cause which was held to be decisive. Some of Aquinas's statements in particular might seem to support this interpretation, such as;

"It is impossible to proceed to infinity in the order of efficient causes which act together at the same time, because in that case the effect would have to depend on an infinite number of actions simultaneously existing. And such cases are essentially infinite, because their infinity is required for the effect caused by them. On the other hand, in the sphere of non-simultaneity acting causes, it is not impossible to proceed to infinity. And the infinity here is accidental to the causes; thus it is accidental to Socrates's father that he is another man's son or not. But it is not accidental to the stick, in moving the stone, that it be moved by the hand; for the stick moves (the stone) just so far as it is moved (by the hand)" (Patterson Brown 1969, 214-236).

Copleston describes the situation this way; though as a Christian theologian (Aquinas) was convinced that the world was not created from eternity, he stoutly maintained that the philosophers had never succeeded in showing the creation from eternity is impossible....That is to say, no philosopher had ever succeeded in showing th impossibility of a series of event without a first assignable member (1955, 157).

⁴From this fundamental criterion Scotus, then claims to derive two more: that essentially ordered causes each step must be to a new order cause, and that a series of per se ordered causes must be instantenous

From the explanation above, we could conclude that in the second way Aquinas is trying to demonstrate the existence of God from the key point that a certain kind of natural regress is impossible. However Aquinas was not arguing that the series of temporally antecedent efficient causes must terminate in a first cause, but, instead, he was arguing that the system of simultaneous efficient causes must terminate in a first cause.

One thing which must concern us is what we may call the role of chronology in this case. To understand it, the best thing to do is to begin by drawing a distinction between different kinds of causal relations, such, I was produced by my parents. And they were produced by their parents. So in a sense, I was produced by my grandparents. But my grandparent were not doing anything as I was being born. They were dead. I come from them not in the sense that my coming needed to be dependent on them as I come to be. I come from them in the sense that they in the past did something which finally resulted in my coming to be.

CONCLUSION

It seems to me that, the second way of Aquinas could be summarized as follow;

- i. experience and causality;
- ii. indicate that the 'cause' which is correlative to the 'effect' is other than the latter;
- iii. that an infinite causal series is impossible; and
- iv. the conclusion that the first uncaused cause exists, to which everybody give the name 'God'.

We have seen the various arguments offered by Aquinas and several of his commentators in interpreting and reformulating the second way from different point of view above. Aquinas's conclusions mentioning that, we need for a first cause to explain the causality of any series of essentially subordinated intermediate causes, and obviously Aquinas's notions of existence and causality are not sheerly empirical notions. Existence is not observable, but it is the immediate significance of the observable, immediately open to mind working within sense - experience. Causality, too, is an immediate significance of the observable, and of the same observable.

On the contrary, such a metaphysical conclusion in the second way has been found unsatisfactory by many philosophers in latter development. The Alexandrian

sceptics denounced the search for 'causes', and their criticisms find famous expression in Hume (including contemporary philosopher such as Flew, Kenny and other). According to this thesis, whatever the origin of our ideas, our knowledge of facts about the world is formulated in statements supported entirely by empirical evidence and that factual statements also are meaningful only insofar they are verifiable.

To sum up briefly, however, I strongly believe that, the careful investigation and examination of the Aquinas's reasoning enable us to perceive that the intrinsic rationale of the argument was manifested and became evident in demonstrate the proof of God existence.

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